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This paper uses panel data from African and Arab countries and Arellano-Bond estimations 
to empirically assess the impact on growth of two primary indicators that are associated 
with MDG 3; namely the ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary enrolment, and the 
ratio of 15-24 year-old literate females to males. Our findings indicate that gender 
inequalities in literacy have a statistically significant negative effect that is robust to 
changes in the specification. We show that higher gender inequality has an even stronger 
effect on income growth in Arab countries. In addition, in more open economies, gender 
inequality in literacy seems to have an additional effect, but this effect is positive; 
suggesting that trade-induced growth may be accompanied by greater inequalities. The 
results associated with the effects of gender inequality in primary and secondary enrolment 
are less robust.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
In Africa and the Arab world promoting gender equality and empowering women (MDG 3) is 
perhaps the most important of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The target 
associated with achieving this goal is to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary 
enrolment preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015 (United Nations 2000). Abu-Ghaida 
and Klasen (2004) estimate what the costs would be in countries that fail to achieve the 
required level of progress towards achieving MDG 3 and find that those countries could have, 
by 2005, 0.1 - 0.3 percentage points lower growth rates, and 0.1  - 0.4 more children per 
woman. The costs by 2015 could be 2.5 percentage points higher prevalence of underweight 
children under the age of five, and 15 per 1000 higher mortality rates for children under five. 
 
Gender inequalities in education tend to be greatest in poor countries and among the poor 
within countries (World Bank, 2001). An important strand of the literature on gender 
inequality in education has examined its impact on growth and development (Hill and King 
1995, Klasen 1999 and 2002, Knowles et al. 2002). For example, Klasen (2002) shows that 
gender inequality in education has direct and indirect effects on growth. Lower female 
education lowers the average level of human capital and thus, has a negative impact on 
growth (direct effect). In addition, gender inequality has an effect on population growth and 
investment and thus, produces an indirect impact on growth. There are also effects from 
increasing female education that impact other dimensions of human development, not just 
economic growth. Knowles et al. (2002) argue that “there is evidence that female education, 
especially in developing countries, also produces social gains by reducing fertility and infant 
mortality, improving family and child health, increasing life expectancy, and increasing the 
quantity and quality of children’s educational attainment” (p. 119).   
 
Some researchers have reported the existence of a positive relationship between gender 
inequality in wages and economic growth (Çagatay and Özler 1995; Standing 1999; Seguino 
2000). For example, Seguino (2000) uses panel data from semi-industrialized economies 
and various econometric specifications, and shows that GDP growth is positively related to 
gender wage inequality. There is some documented evidence suggesting that women are 
over-represented in export-oriented sectors, and particularly manufacturing. The gender 
differential in wage rates can to a large extent be explained by the fact that women tend to 
be crowded into lower paying jobs (Seguino, 2000). If lower wage reflects lower   3 
educational levels, then the relationship  between gender inequality in education and 
growth may turn out to be positive (Baliamoune-Lutz 2005).  
 
This paper uses data from a group of sub-Saharan African (SSA) and Arab countries and 
Arellano-Bond estimations to examine the effects  on growth of two  main indicators of 
gender inequality in education; namely the ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary 
enrolment, and the ratio of young (15-24 year old) female to male literacy rates. We focus 
on these indicators because they are two of the four indicators that are specifically 
associated with MDG 3 (the other two are the share of women in wage employment in the 
non-agricultural sector and the proportion of seats held by women in national parliament).  
The aim of the study is to focus on what is often referred to as the  instrumental effects of 
gender equality in education. We do not examine the  intrinsic  dimension of female 
education; which in essence derives from the role of education in enhancing a woman’s set 
of capabilities (see Sen 1999).1 
 
The  methodology used in this paper differs from the one often employed in the existing 
literature in one important aspect. While most other studies focusing on the effects of 
gender inequality in education use either cross-sectional data for a single point in time or 
average data over several years and use the average from a group of countries (pooled cross 
sections), we use time series (7 periods made up of four-year averages) and cross sectional 
data and undertake a dynamic panel estimation using the Arellano-Bond procedure.  It is 
often argued in the empirical literature that the endogeneity of some regressors in growth 
(or income) equations seriously weakens the validity of empirical results. Dollar and Gatti 
(1999), Klasen (1999), and Knowles et al. (2002) all include 2SLS estimations to account 
for the endogeneity of some regressors. However, finding appropriate instruments (for IV 
estimation) to circumvent the problem of endogeneity in dynamic panel data is, at best, 
extremely complicated. The Arellano-Bond estimation basically differences the endogenous 
and predetermined variables and uses lags of their own levels as instruments, and it seems 
to be an appropriate technique for modeling the type of relationships examined in this 
paper.  
 
                                                                  
1 This distinction is important and is often made in the literature on the effects of gender inequality in 
education. See for example, World Bank (2001), Subrahmanian (2002), Klasen (2002), and Abu-Ghaida and 
Klasen (2004). See also Jackson (1996) for an interesting discussion of the instrumentalist approach to the 
relationship between gender and development. 
   4 
The empirical results we derive in this paper indicate that inequality in literacy has a 
statistically significant negative effect on income that is quite robust to changes in the 
specification. Moreover, in Arab countries, gender inequality has an even a greater effect on 
income. The estimations using inequality in primary and secondary enrolment yield less 
robust results. However, controlling for oil producing countries, we again show that lower 
female secondary education leads to lower growth (change in income) in Arab countries. 
Surprisingly, we find statistical evidence that the gap in secondary and primary enrolment 
may have a positive effect, while total secondary education (proxy for human capital) has a 
negative impact.   
 
The outline of the remainder of the paper is  as follows. Section 2 discusses the links 
between female education and growth. Section 3 describes the methodology and variable 
selection. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.  Female education and Growth 
 
Economists have commonly focused on per-capita income as the primary indicator of 
development, although there are several other indicators of development. In mainstream 
economic theory, education often represents one important aspect of human capital and 
enters the production function with a positive coefficient. Lower male or female educational 
levels translate into lower human capital. Thus, in theory, there is a direct effect from 
female education to income (or growth). There are also some solid arguments to support 
additional positive influences of female education on growth beyond this direct effect. 
These include the impact on the mother’s health, the child’s health and education, and 
fertility rates. Empirical data have, in general, supported the existence of these indirect 
effects.  Higher female education makes women better-informed mothers and hence could 
contribute to lowering child mortality rates and malnutrition (Aly 1990; Smith and 
Haddad, 1999; Knowles et al. 2002; Klasen 2003). Increasing the proportion of educated 
women may also contribute to lowering fertility rates. In general, female education is 
negatively correlated to fertility and lower fertility levels are associated with lower 
dependency ratios. In turn, lower dependency ratios are associated with higher income (see 
Table 3). 
   5 
Female education may cause a shift from a focus on  quantity to a focus on  quality in 
reproductive outcomes. Additionally, if more female education is associated with increased 
feminization of the labor force, this also may result in lower fertility. Female education is 
thought to allow women to have autonomy; control over resources and their lives (Basu 
2002) and could, in some cases, have a stronger impact on fertility than does income (see 
Handa 2000 for the case of Jamaica). Finally, there is some empirical evidence that the 
effect of female adult education on the enrolment of children in the household may be 
greater than that of the male (Filmer 1999).  
 
Empirical data show, in general, that there is a positive correlation between education and 
growth (see for example, Schultz 1994). This seems to be the general consensus. Where 
there is less consensus is whether both male and female education have similar (positive) 
contributions to growth (assuming causality is from education to growth or after factoring 
in the endogeneity aspect of the relationship). For example, Barro and Lee (1994) and 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), using cross-sectional data, find a negative coefficient on 
female education. However, this finding was r efuted by other researchers mainly on the 
grounds of econometric problems in the empirical estimation, including multicollinearity 
(Knowles et al. 2002) and not accounting for anomalies such as the presence of high female 
education and low growth in Latin America, which could have been taken into account by, 
for example, including a Latin America dummy variable, as was done in Dollar and Gatti 
(1999).  On the other hand, Caselli et al. (1996), using a GMM model, report a positive 
coefficient on female schooling and a negative coefficient on male schooling, both of which 
were statistically significant.  
 
Several empirical studies have focused specifically on the role of gender inequality in 
education as a determinant of income or growth. Recent work includes  Filmer (1999), 
Esteve-Volart (2000), Klasen (1999, 2002), Knowles (2002), and Klasen and Lamanna 
(2003). In general, the conclusions from these studies support the existence of a negative 
effect from gender inequality in education to income or economic growth. For example, 
Klasen (2002) uses OLS and TSLS estimations on data from developed and developing 
countries and shows that gender inequality has negative influences both directly, by 
reducing human capital; and indirectly, through its effect on population growth and 
investment. Esteve -Volart (2000) uses Barro and Lee (1994) data set for about 87 countries 
to explore the relationship between growth in per capita GDP and gender inequality in   6 
primary schooling in the base year and reports that increasing the female to male primary 
schooling ratio leads to higher economic growth. Similarly, Knowles et al. (2002), use a 
neo-classical growth model, and cross-sectional data from a large group of countries (about 
72), and show that higher female education contributes to higher labor productivity, 
whereas the effect of male education is ambiguous. 
 
It is important to note that cross-sectional data from developed and developing countries 
reveal two stylized facts. First, gender inequality in education is higher in low-income 
countries; i.e., countries with low levels of economic development. Second, gender 
inequality in education tends to be high in countries with low total literacy rates 
(educational attainment). However, these relationships may not be linear. Dollar and Gatti 
(1999) show that there is a convex relationship between gender inequality in education 
attainment (the dependent variable) and income (regressor); as per-capita income rises 
from very low to a middle level, the improvements in female attainment are negligible, but 
when countries move from middle to higher levels of income, the effect on female 
educational attainment accelerates. Dollar and Gatti argue that “[o]ne plausible 
explanation of this relationship is that there are market failures that hinder investment in 
girls and that these failures diminish as countries develop”.  This argument, however, 
requires a clear definition of what constitute middle income. Several Latin American 
countries, for example, are at (or slightly below) what is commonly considered the middle-
income range, yet they have already achieved high female educational levels. On the other 
hand, some Arab countries (oil producers in particular) have high income, yet female 
attainment levels are low. Finally, Esteve-Volart (2000) also obtains a convex relationship 
but with female-to-male primary schooling ratio (gender equality) being the regressor and 
growth being the dependent variable.  This suggests the effect of female education is 
initially weak but accelerates as female education attains higher levels. This is quite 
plausible given the positive externalities (in terms of social and economic benefits) 
associated with female education. Indeed, if those externalities could be internalized, we 
should expect the marginal growth associated with higher female education in many 
developing countries (perhaps with the exception of some Latin American countries) to be 
increasing rather than diminishing.   
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We start by s electing variables that are commonly used in income or growth equations. 
These variables include the investment rate, human capital, and fertility rates.2 The 
investment rate has also been used in equations that specifically focus on the effects of 
gender  inequality on growth or income (Klasen 1999 and 2002, Knowles et al. 2002). 
Human capital is usually represented by educational attainment, secondary schooling, or a 
similar indicator. Most recent studies use average years of schooling from Barro and Lee 
(1996). In general, average years of schooling are used to proxy for stocks of educational 
human capital while school enrolment rates tend to proxy for investment in educational 
human capital (Knowles et al. 2002). In the present study we use two alternate proxies for 
educational human capital; youth literacy rates and secondary school enrolment. This is 
justified mainly by the fact that these two indicators are the ones explicitly associated with 
the target for achieving MDG 3.  
A major dimension that must be taken into account when analyzing the effects of gender 
inequality is the impact of greater integration in the world economy. A global division of 
labor between developed and developing countries may have resulted from globalization 
and this may affect  women differently relative to men. Previous studies have tried to 
account for the importance of the international sector by including an indicator of 
distortions in the trade regime such as the black market premium on foreign exchange 
(Barro and Lee 1994, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, Dollar and Gatti 1999, Knowles et al. 
2002). We use openness to international trade, measured as the ratio of trade (exports and 
imports) to GDP, as an indicator of a country’s extent of integration in world markets.3  It is 
important to emphasize that gender inequality may have an ambiguous relationship with 
openness to trade. On the one hand, greater openness may cause a developing country’s 
exports to expand and could narrow the gap between skilled and unskilled labor, thus 
improving the relative wage of women who tend to constitute a large portion of the 
unskilled labor force. On the other hand, increased openness to trade could cause 
                                                                  
2 Klasen (1999, 2002) uses population growth while we use changes in fertility rates and female share of the 
labor force instead of population growth primarily because they may be better suited for capturing the indirect 
effects of gender education and gender inequality on incom e. Also, fertility rates have been used in the growth 
equations in studies by Barro and Barro and co-authors, and in Dollar and Gatti (1999).  
3 Klasen (1999, 2002) includes the same measure of openness to trade in his estimation of the effect of gender 
inequality in education on growth.    8 
important shifts in the demand for skilled labor and hence cause the wage gap between 
skilled and unskilled workers to widen (see for example Wood [1997] on Latin America). 
This may increase gender inequality as women tend to be over-represented in the pool of 
unskilled labor. Indeed, other studies have found that trade liberalization did not 
necessarily reduce inequalities between men and women (Standing 1999; Çagatay 2001; 
Baliamoune-Lutz 2005). Several studies (for example, Çagatay 2001; Fontana and Wood 
2000) have also reported that in agriculture-based economies, greater openness to trade 
may cause higher gender inequality. This is quite relevant to the case of many African and 
Arab countries as they tend to have agriculture-based economies. Moreover, openness to 
international trade may be influenced by gender inequality in wages (which could in turn 
be caused by inequality in education). The availability of cheap labor in the form of mainly 
uneducated female workers could contribute to the growth of the export sector. 
 
Another variable that seems to be missing from many previous studies of the effects of 
gender inequality in education is the share of women in the labor force. Ertück and Darity 
(2000) find that changes in the gender composition of employment resulting from the 
global division of labor may impede the gains from trade liberalization, and argue that 
developing countries may be faced with divergent paths; increasing feminization rate with 
falling per-capita income, or rising per-capita income with decreasing feminization rates. 
To the extent that some of the countries in this study are on the former path, we may find a 
higher percentage of women in the labor force to be associated with a lower income. 
Indeed, Table 1 shows that SSA has a percentage of female labor force (42%) that is almost 
as high as that of high-income countries (43%) and significantly higher than the percentage 
in the MENA region (28%) and in upper middle-income countries (36%). Yet, SSA has the 
lowest indicators of economic and human development. Interestingly, the correlation 
(Table 3) between the female share of the labor force and per-capita income (in log) is 
negative and quite large in magnitude (-0.65). 
 
Pritchett (2001) performs OLS and IV estimations on cross-sectional data from a large 
group of countries (70 to 91 countries depending on the specification)  and finds no 
association between higher educational attainment (as a component of human capital) and 
growth. He suggests three possible factors that may account for this result, bad (or what he 
calls perverse) institutional/governance environment, a rapid decline in marginal returns   9 
to education (caused by excess supply of educated labor), and educational quality that is so 
poor that there was no contribution to human capital. Our model tries to control for the 
first factor by including the variable democracy in the equation. We admit that perhaps 
better measures would be more formal indicators of governance such as the ones developed 
by Kaufmann et al. (1999) and updated in the subsequent years, but the unavailability of 
data for the early periods in our sample prevented its use in the present study. We should 
point out that democracy is also included as a regressor in the growth equations in 
essentially all the studies by Barro and by Barro and co-authors, while Dollar and Gatti 
(1999) use the rule of law as a regressor.  
 
Finally, culture and religion were found to be an important factor in explaining why women 
tend to have fewer opportunities to go to school. For example, Dollar and Gatti (1999) show 
that religion “systematically explains differences in gender inequality”. In this paper, we try 
to account for culture by using interaction terms between gender inequality and a dummy 
variable for Arab countries in order to test the effect of the ‘Arab culture’. 4   
 
We use seven 4-year average periods starting with 1974-77. We have tried to include all 
African and Arab countries for which data were available for all variables used in the 
estimation during a given period, a total of 41 countries. Thus, the panel is unbalanced and 
we have different numbers of observations depending on the variables included in the 
estimation. Appendix A describes the variables and identifies the source of data used in this 
study, and provides a list of the countries included in the sample. Table 3 includes 
correlation coefficients. We note from the figures displayed in the table that the 
correlations between the indicators of gender inequality and fertility rates (in log) are 
significant (0.51 and 0.53). Similarly, the correlations between gender inequality on the one 
hand, and income, openness, life expectancy, and investment rates are negative and 
statistically significant. In addition, the correlation between the gap in youth literacy and 
the gap in primary and secondary enrolment is very large (0.9). Finally, it is interesting 
                                                                  
4 The effect of religion as we observe the real world is complex. As an example, adult female to male literacy 
ratios in 2000 varied from 0.58 in Morocco (a moderate Muslim country with a fairly good representation of 
women in the parliament and a high participation of women in the labor force (Klasen and Lamanna, 2003), to 
0.80 in Saudi Arabia (generally considered the Muslim country with the most unequal gender rights), to 0.89 
and 0.91 in Indonesia (the largest Muslim country in the world) and Malaysia, respectively. Note that women 
in Indonesia have held the highest office in government (Megawati Sukarnoputri as president of Indonesia) 
while those in Saudi Arabia are not allowed to vote or even drive. Therefore, although, the two can be strongly 
correlated, we think culture, not religion, should be included in this analysis. In this specific sample, it happens 
that Muslim and Arab countries almost coincide (Sudan and Mauritania are Muslim counties but are not 
included in Arab countries, instead we  include them in SSA).    10 
(though this is expected) to observe that, on average, countries with higher educational 
gaps also have lower total literacy rates. The correlation between adult literacy and the gap 





We use the Arellano-Bond estimation to examine the effects of educational gaps between 
women and men while taking into account the possible endogeneity of several right-hand- 
side (RHS) variables (such as fertility, female labor force, investment, human capital, and 
inequality). Our equation includes a lagged dependent variable (initial income)5. Since we 
are using panel data we have to deal with random and fixed effects.  In particular, the 
presence of random effects creates correlation between the error term and the lagged 
dependent variable. The Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments ( GMM) 
specification6 takes care of this problem. It differences the endogenous and predetermined 
variables and uses lags of their own levels as instruments. We examine the relationship 
between gender inequality in education and income starting from the following 
specification: 
yi,t = ayi,t-1 + X i,t ß  + hi + xt + ei,t           (1) 
 
where y is income per capita in log form and X is a row vector of the factors determining 
income, some of which are endogenous, hi  is the individual (country) fixed effect, and xt is 
a time-specific effect.  Applying the Arellano-Bond specification yields the following: 
 
Dyi,t = aDyi,t-1 + DX i,tß  + hi + xt + ei,t      (2) 
 
 
In our model, investment, human capital, fertility, the share of women in the labor force, 
democracy, openness, and gender inequality are treated as endogenous. We also include 
(exogenous) dummy variables for ‘SSA’ and ‘oil’, and some interaction terms that are 
treated as predetermined since they reflect the interaction between an exogenous variable 
and a predetermined variable. Estimation results are discussed in the next section.  
                                                                  
5 Since we use averages for a 4-year periods, we consider the lagged value of income (yt-1) as the initial income 
for the determination of yt which allows us to test for conditional convergence. 
6 See Arellano and Bond (1991) for more details.     11 
4.  Estimation results 
 
Table 4 displays the results from estimating the model with gender inequality in education 
(gapylit) defined as the gap between youth female literacy rates and youth male literacy 
rates (see Appendix A for more details). We have also reported Sargan test results to assess 
the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. Based on the test results we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid in all cases (as well as in 
those reported in Table 5). The validity of the GMM estimation is based on the condition of 
no second-order autocorrelation. Thus, we report the values for the Arellano-Bond test that 
average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is zero. The results confirm that there is no 
second-order autocorrelation. 
 
The results associated with equation 1 (Eq. 1) indicate that the coefficients on income and 
investment are positive and statistically very significant. There is a substantial work on 
growth (or income) convergence using cross sectional data from OECD and developing 
countries, but there is no strong argument to be made for expecting the same to take place 
in our group of countries. In fact, it has been shown that African countries with relatively 
higher income do on average grow faster (see Baliamoune 2002).  As can be seen from the 
figures in Table 2, there is no indication that the standard deviation of income per capita in 
the group of African and Arab countries in our sample has a  downward trend. On the 
contrary, in 1980 and 1995, the standard deviation was much larger than in 1975. One 
possible reason why there is little convergence in Africa is the recurrence of conflict in some 
of the lower-income countries. All other variables i n this equation turn out with 
insignificant coefficients. In equation 2, we replace fertility with the female share of the 
labor force. Fertility rates tend to be highly correlated with gender inequality and the 
nonsignificance of its coefficient may be due to multicollinearity. In equation 2, both 
human capital (youth literacy rates) and gender inequality are statistically significant (at 
the 10-percent level) and have the expected signs; positive for the former and negative for 
the latter. In addition, the coefficient on the share of women in total labor force (flaborf) is 
statistically significant but with a negative sign. This is hardly surprising. SSA has a 
relatively high female share of the labor force (as mentioned earlier), most of which are in 
the  agricultural sector and are over-represented in the pool of unskilled labor. If one 
subscribes to the feminization U  proposition (see for example, Çagatay and Özler 1995), 
then higher female share of the labor force reflects lower development. However, since we   12 
have taken into consideration the endogeneity of the variable flaborf, finding a negative 
coefficient may convey the low productivity of jobs held by women. As the female share in 
total labor force increases, the male share, which tends to be relatively large in higher 
productivity sectors falls, hence the negative effect on income growth. The SSA dummy 
variable is significant and has the negative sign often reported in cross-country studies.  
 
In equations 3 -6 we include interaction terms. First, we include a term interacting the 
variable ‘Arab’ with gender inequality. Then we add a term interacting openness to trade 
with gender inequality. We drop the SSA dummy variable because of its high correlation 
with the dummy variable ‘Arab’. The estimates associated with the four equations clearly 
show that gender inequality has a robust negative effect on income growth while our 
measure of educational human capital has a positive impact. In Arab countries, gender 
inequality has an even stronger negative impact. Interestingly, the interaction between 
gender inequality and openness produces a positive effect. This suggests that some of the 
growth caused by greater openness may also be the due to higher gender inequality, with a 
large share of uneducated women being employed in export sectors. There is documented 
empirical evidence that export-oriented sectors (manufacturing) employ a large share of 
the female labor force (see for example, Seguino 2000). In the case of Africa, many of the 
exports are agricultural products where a large portion of female labor is employed, and 
this could explain the positive sign on the interaction between the gender gap and 
openness. 
 
Turning to the results of estimations using the second indicator of gender inequality in 
education, namely the gap between female and male primary and secondary enrolment 
ratios (Table 5), we note that they are rather different. The first 3 equations show that the 
only variables with statistically significant coefficients are lagged income and oil in all three 
equations, and SSA and gender inequality in equation 1. Neither one of the interactive 
terms is significant. In equations 4-6, we use a term interacting female secondary education 
with the dummy variable ‘Arab’, and this term has a statistically significant coefficient in all 
three equations. In addition, we include the interaction between openness and female 
secondary education, and between the share of females in the labor force and female 
secondary education. However, both interaction terms have insignificant coefficients. 
Surprisingly, although its magnitude is very small, the coefficient on the proxy for   13 
educational human capital is negative and statistically significant, and the one on the gap in 
primary and secondary education is positive and statistically significant in two 
specifications.   
 
In summary, the results reported in Table 4 yield strong statistical evidence that 
educational human capital has a positive impact and the gender gap in literacy has a 
negative influence on income growth. Moreover, controlling for oil, the effect is stronger in 
Arab countries. Interacting openness to trade with gender inequality shows a positive effect 
on income growth, and including this term in the estimation makes the effect of openness 
statistically significant although very small in magnitude. This may be consistent with the 
empirical literature. In general, it is not clear whether trade is always beneficial to 
developing countries. While earlier empirical work has documented the positive impact, a 
number of recent studies have obtained different results, with some authors reporting that 
trade liberalization is not significantly associated with growth or that trade liberalization 
may, indeed, have a negative impact on growth (Mukhopadhyay 1999; Rodriguez and 
Rodrik 2001; Baliamoune 2002). For example, Mukhopadhyay (1999) finds that the 
liberalization of imports for some SSA countries has led to a decline in growth in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Also, Baliamoune (2002) shows that increased openness to trade in 
African countries has led to income divergence, rather than convergence, within Africa; 
with openness causing income in poorer countries to grow slower relative to higher-income 
countries. We also find that democracy is not significant in any of the equations. This could 
be due either to low scores for the majority of countries in our sample or the fact that 
causality may very well be from income growth to democracy. On the other hand, the 
estimates reported in Table 5 do not show robust results, but female secondary education 
has a consistently positive impact in Arab countries. Given that secondary and primary 
education may suffer from serious measurement problems and they do not reflect drop 
rates, and that literacy rates may be a better proxy for the stock of educational human 
capital, the discussion in the next section will focus mainly on the results associated with 
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5.  Conclusion 
 
We have performed Arellano-Bond estimations using panel data from a number of African 
and Arab countries to try to assess the empirical links between gender inequality in 
education and growth (proxied by changes in income). The focus was on two major 
indicators that are explicitly associated with MDG 3; namely the ratio of girls to boys in 
primary and secondary enrolment ratios, and the ratio of literate 15-24 year old females to 
males. The empirical results indicate that gender inequalities in literacy have a statistically 
significant and robust negative effect. Interestingly, in more open economies gender 
inequality in literacy seems to have an additional effect but this effect is positive, thus 
suggesting that growth resulting from greater integration may be associated with (or 
benefiting from) greater inequalities. Moreover, in Arab countries, higher gender inequality 
is shown to have an even stronger effect on income growth. The results associated with the 
effect of gender inequality in primary and secondary enrolments are less robust but there is 
robust statistical evidence that female secondary education has a positive effect on growth 
in Arab countries.  It is important to note that more recently (in the 1990s) there has been a 
significant fall in illiteracy rates in most Arab countries and a trend towards narrowing the 
gender gap in education at a rate faster than that observed in East Asia (Klasen and 
Lamanna 2003). Still, one should keep in mind that this rapid fall in the gap may convey a 
catching-up effect since educational levels in Arab countries are in general lower for men 
and women. More importantly, the observed narrowing in the gap is not inconsistent with 
our findings, which show that the  negative effects from gender inequality in literacy on 
income growth in Arab countries can be higher than in sub-Saharan African countries. 
Thus, The fall in educational gender gaps is viewed as a cause for relief but also for call that 
the programs and resources underlying this trend should be extended to all areas and not 
limited to urban areas, as is the often the case in North African Arab countries.   
 
The findings in the present study (using literacy rates) associated with the variables 
investment and human capital are in line with the empirical literature on growth. However, 
we do not find evidence of conditional convergence as our results suggest divergence 
(higher-income countries grow faster). Our findings are qualitatively consistent with the 
results reported in Klasen (1999, 2002), and Klasen and Lamanna (2003). In particular, 
the results for Arab countries are in line with the findings reported in Klasen and Lamanna   15 
(2003).7  The authors provide point estimates indicating that the growth reduction (per 
year) due to the gender gap in education in the Middle East and North Africa is about 0.7 
percentage points but they stress that the cost of the gender gap in employment is even 
higher. This is consistent with the data on the female share of the labor force and female 
literacy rates. While the gap in education has been narrowed, moving Arab countries closer 
to other regions, the gap in employment is very large. In 2000, the share of women in the 
total labor force was 27.71%, the lowest in all world regions (Table 1). On the other hand, 
given that in our model we find that the female share of the labor force has a negative 
impact on growth (perhaps due to very large percentages in SSA), we should be careful in 
interpreting the women’s share of the labor force as a suitable indicator of female equality 
in employment.  
 
This paper contributes at least two new elements to the empirical literature on the effects of 
gender inequality in education. First, we include a larger number of Arab and African 
countries (41 countries) to examine the effects of gender inequality in education, and the 
group of countries we use is more homogenous than the samples used in Klasen (1999, 
2002) and Knowles et al. (2002)8, since they include developed and developing countries. 
Second, this is the first time Arellano-Bond estimations, which allow us to tackle the issue 
of endogeneity in dynamic panel data, is used for this type of investigation.9 We should also 
point out that a potential limitation stems from the use of a short  panel (4-year periods) 
that may not adequately capture long-term variation. However, in this study a tradeoff 
needed to be made; smaller sample versus shorter panel.  
 
Finally, an important question must be raised. If female education is good for growth why 
don’t countries try to increase the levels of female education? Empirical studies cite several 
reasons including culture, religion, and market failures. Dollar and Gatti (1999) argue that 
“[t]he fact that increases in income lead to lower gender inequality suggests that there may 
                                                                  
7 We must point out, however, that Klasen and Lamanna (2003) use a fixed-effects model which would 
normally lead to biased estimates with dynamic panel data, such as growth models containing a dependent 
lagged variable (initial income) on the RHS.  
8 Knowles et al. (2002) include two non-African Arab countries (Jordan and Syria) and 16 African countries, 
including North Africa, while Klasen (1999, 2002) does not show the list of countries.  
9 Citing Hendry (1995, p. 287), Knowles et al. (2002) argue that by removing the country-specific effect (by 
differencing the time-series) in a dynamic panel, the GMM estimation eliminates the between-country 
variation in levels. The authors rightly point out that this is of particular concern if the cross-section variation 
in the levels is larger than that of the time series. However, our paper includes a group of countries that is more 
homogenous than the ones in other studies and the data on literacy (and schooling) have changed a lot over 
time (within countries) so that the time-series variation is likely to be greater than the cross-section variation.    16 
be market failures that hinder investment in girls in developing countries and that these are 
typically overcome as development proceeds” (p. 22). In the presence of market failures 
that may cause underinvestment in female education, the role of public policy in 
reallocating resources and creating an environment for equal opportunities is vital. It is 
also important to consider the supply (the provision of education) and demand (household 
investment in education) dimensions of gender equality in education. 
 
On the demand side, demand for girls' education tends to be more sensitive to costs, 
distance to school, and school quality than demand for boys' education (World Bank 2001). 
Four major groups of factors that determine a household’s decision to send girls to school 
are identified by Subrahmanian (2002). They are households livelihood and aspirations; 
the macroeconomic environment of the labor market; the prospects and capacities of 
individual children; and factors relating to schooling provision, including quality, 
proximity, and inclusiveness. It is clear that some of these factors may be difficult to 
influence by public policy, but factors relating to supply, such as school proximity 
(especially in rural areas), inclusiveness, quality, equal opportunities in employment can be 
altered by appropriate policies. On the demand side, the task could be much harder, as the 
factors include perceptions about the role of women that are often influenced by culture 
and/or religion. Civil society (NGOs) may perhaps be more successful than public policy, in 
raising awareness of the social and economic benefits of female education.  
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 Table 1: Sub -Saharan Africa, MENA and other regions of the world: Selected Indicators 
 
 
  Labor force, 

















Ratio of girls 

















income  36.22  71.34  96.71  100.70  101.44  8817  0.56 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA)  41.96  46.53  77.30  88.38  81.74  1808  0.89 
Middle East & North 
Africa (MENA)  27.71  67.87  79.99  85.32  88.08  5403  0.69 
Middle income  42.07  69.48  95.14  97.49  98.26  5339  0.53 
High income  43.14  77.87  ..  ..  101.24  26345  0.48 
Data are for 2000, except those for ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%) in SSA and MENA and middle-
income countries, which are for 1998. 
 
Source: Word Development Indicators, World Bank (2003). 






























































                             
1970  3.20  0.90  6.65  3.91    17.71  16.41  78.36  56.92  1.44  65.47  41.19  1.80  35.55 
  1.13  0.11  0.87  6.48    18.17  7.12  18.50  17.93  0.32  23.77  20.01  0.78  13.95 
                             
1975  3.38  0.90  6.61  1.76  1940  17.35  22.69  73.69  51.77  1.50  58.79  36.18  1.88  35.84 
  1.24  0.13  1.02  8.68  3996  24.61  10.47  19.74  18.21  0.37  24.85  19.55  0.94  13.40 
                             
1980  3.67  0.90  6.46  -0.42  2620  15.24  21.73  68.35  46.73  1.54  52.04  31.61  1.96  36.12 
  1.34  0.14  1.13  8.88  5112  23.73  8.92  21.12  18.21  0.40  25.64  19.06  1.17  12.90 
                             
1985  3.93  0.90  6.21  -0.74  2461  11.65  18.52  62.66  41.84  1.59  45.08  27.46  2.02  36.42 
  1.58  0.14  1.19  7.14  3812  19.35  8.95  22.06  18.07  0.44  25.91  18.35  1.50  12.17 
                             
1990  3.83  0.89  5.77  -1.38  2705  10.42  18.85  56.93  37.22  1.64  38.51  23.61  2.12  36.71 
  1.85  0.14  1.22  10.13  3843  19.30  7.47  22.62  17.80  0.50  25.50  17.42  2.23  11.50 
                             
1995  3.93  0.87  5.26  1.91  3346  10.73  21.14  51.22  32.93  1.69  32.74  20.33  2.40  37.36 
  1.78  0.15  1.27  6.14  4741  16.18  12.10  22.78  17.31   0.57  24.69  16.49  4.15  10.58 
                             
2000  3.90  0.83  4.80  0.86  3252  13.41  19.46  45.42  28.88  1.74  27.66  17.58  2.49  37.92 
  2.02  0.16  1.29  4.67  3864  17.25  7.94  22.64  16.72  0.64  23.40  15.46  4.82  9.72 
Source: Word Development Indicators, World Bank (2003) 








Table 3. correlation coefficients  
 
                       linc        logfert    flaborf     adlit       ylit        gapps       gapylit     open     lifexp      edexp     agedep      sav      invest                                
   logfert    -0.5702     
   flaborf    -0.6503   0.2350     
   adlit          0.5584  -0.6121  -0.2722     
   ylit            0.5411  -0.5486  -0.2958   0.9703     
   gapps      -0.3781   0.5137   0.0685  -0.8096  -0.7645     
   gapylit     -0.5018   0.5327   0.1560  -0.8967  -0.8811   0.8997     
   open         0.4056  -0.2299  -0.2561   0.4133   0.3934  -0.3782   -0.4331   
   lifexp        0.7463  -0.5489  -0.7294   0.5518   0.5633  -0.3947   -0.4530   0.3025    
   edexp       0.4006  -0.2724  -0.1854   0.3947   0.3780  -0.3676   -0.3115    0.3957     0.3030    
   agedep    -0.6394   0.7302   0.4427  -0.3924  -0.3256   0.3567    0.3790    -0.2331   -0.4936  -0.1461    
   sav            0.5053  -0.0585  -0.4221   0.0937   0.1589   0.0820   -0.0012    0.1774     0.3452   0.1958    -0.2140    
   invest       0.2697  -0.1608  -0.2123   0.2649   0.2721  -0.2433    -0.2597    0.6164     0.2181   0.2615    -0.1820    0.1586    
   growth     0.0918  -0.0074  -0.0201   0.0624   0.0772  -0.0923   -0.1123   0.3189      0.0643   0.0881    0.0028    0.0696   0.4566    
 
  
See Appendix A for variable description. 
 
 Table 4 :  Arellano-Bond GMM Estimation; dep variable: income per capita (in log).  
The measure of gender inequality in education based on the gap between female    
and male youth literacy rates 
 
  Eq. 1  Eq. 2  Eq. 3  Eq. 4  Eq. 5  Eq. 6 




































lnylit  0.264 
(0.215) 










gapylit  -0.026 
(0.047) 
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(0.056) 
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(0.159) 
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Values for the constant term are omitted. Based on the Wald test (not shown) we reject the null 
hypothesis of joint nonsignificance in all cases at the 1-percent or 5-percent level. 
 
a The dummy variable SSA is omitted in equations 3-6 due to it strong correlation (-0.68) with 
the interaction term Arab_gapylit  
b Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0. 
c Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions.   
 
See Appendix A for variable description and data source. 
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Table 5 :  Arellano-Bond GMM Estimation; Dep variable: income per capita (in log).  
The measure of gender inequality in education based on the gap between female 
and male  primary and secondary education 
  Eq. 1  Eq. 2  Eq. 3  Eq. 4  Eq. 5  Eq. 6 
linc  0.339***   
(0.090) 
0.388***   
(0.087) 
0.387***    
(0.104) 






linvest  0.051   
(0.056) 




0.106**   
(0.052) 




open  -0.0005   
(0.0007) 






-0.0005   
(0.0006) 








-0.0009   
(0.002) 
-0.005**   
(0.002) 
-0.005**   
(0.002) 
-0.005**   
(0.002) 




0.231   
(0.321) 
0.422*   
(0.216) 
















fertility  0.294   
(0.211) 











-0.0002   
(0.011) 






    -0.059   
0.0369 
     
open_gap-ps      0.0003  
(0.0003) 
     
Arab_femsecenr        0.004**  
(0.0019) 




flabforce_femsecenr          0.0001 
(0.0001) 
 
open_ femsecenr            0.00002   
(0.00002) 
Exogenous variables             




    0.015 
(0.031) 
 
Oil  -0.055***    
(0.021) 
-0.042*   
(0.023) 
-0.056**   
(0.025) 
-0.041*   
(0.022) 




obs  67  66  66  66  66  66 




























Values for the constant term are omitted. Values for the constant term are omitted. Based on 
the Wald test (not shown) we reject the null hypothesis of joint nonsignificance in all cases at 
the 1-percent or 5-percent level. 
 
a The dummy variable SSA is omitted in equations 3-6 due to it strong correlation (-0.68) with 
the interaction term Arab_gapylit  
b Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0. 
c Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions.   
 




A1. Data description and source 
 
Arab:  A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country is an Arab country and 0 
otherwise. Sudan and Mauritania are members of the Arab league but are not 
included in Arab countries in this paper due to significant cultural differences. 
 
agedep: Age dependency ratio; dependents to working-age population. Age dependency 
ratio is the ratio of dependents-people younger than 15 and older than 64-to the 
working-age population-those ages 15-64.  Source: World Development Indicators 
CD-ROM (WDI). 
 
fertility: Fertility rate, total (births per woman). Total fertility rate represents the number of 
children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her 
childbearing years and bear children in accordance with prevailing age-specific 
fertility rates. Source: WDI. 
logfert: Log of fertility. 
 
flaborf:  Labor force, female (% of total labor force). Female labor force as a percentage of 
the total show the extent to which women are active in the labor force. Source: WDI. 
 
invest:  investm ent or Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP); gross domestic fixed 
investment as a % of GDP. Source: WDI. 
linvest: log of investment. 
 
linc:   log of GDP per capita, PPP (current international $). PPP GDP per capita is gross 
domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity 
rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. 
dollar has in the United States. Source: WDI. 
 
   Illiteracy rate:  adult female or male (% of females or males ages 15 and above): Adult 
illiteracy rate is the percentage of people ages 15 and above who cannot, with 
understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. 
Source: WDI. 
 
   Illiteracy rate, youth female or male (% of females or males ages 15-24): Youth illiteracy rate 
is the percentage of people ages 15-24 who cannot, with understanding, read and 
write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Source: WDI. 
 
lnylit: log of  youth literacy rates (total).  
  
gapylit: The difference between absolute equality (ratio of 1) and the actual ratio of youth 
female to male literacy rates. Source: Authors calculation. 
 
open:  Trade (% of GDP):  The sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured 
as a share of gross domestic product. Source: WDI. 
 
Arab_gap_ylit: Interaction term between the variable gapylit and the dummy variable 
‘Arab’.   26 
 
open_gap_ylit: Interaction term between the variable gapylit and the variable open. 
 
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%): The percentage of girls to 
boys enrolled at primary and secondary levels in public and private schools. Gross 
enrolment ratio is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of 
the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Source: 
WDI. 
 
  gapps:  calculated (by the author) as the difference between absolute equality (ratio of 1) and 
the actual ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%). 
 
Secondenr:  Secondary enrolment (total, gross) The percentage of girls and boys enrolled in 
secondary levels in public and private schools. Gross enrolment is total enrolment, 
regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the 
level of education shown. Source: WDI. 
 
  femsecenr: Female secondary enrolment (gross) The percentage of girls enrolled in 
secondary levels in public and private schools. Gross enrolment is total enrolment, 
regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the 
level of education shown. Source: WDI. 
 
Arab_gapps: Interaction term between the variable gapps and the dummy variable ‘Arab’. 
 
open_gapps: Interaction term between the variable gapps and the dummy variable open. 
 
Arab_femsecenr: Interaction term between the variable femsecenr and the dummy variable 
‘Arab’. 
 
flabforce_femsecenr: Interaction term between the variable femsecenr and the flaborf. 
 
open_ femsecenr: Interaction term between the variable femsecenr and the open. 
 
democ:  An indicator of institutional democracy. Source: Polity IV Project, Marshall, Monty 
G. and Jaggers, Keith (2003). 
 
Oil:   A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country is an oil producing country and 
0 otherwise.    
 
SSA:   A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country is in sub-Saharan Africa and 0 
otherwise.      27 
A2. List of countries 
 
Botswana        Algeria   
Burkina Faso      Egypt, Arab Rep. 
Burundi        Jordan   
Cameroon        Kuwait   
Central African Republic    Morocco   
Chad      Oman   
Congo, Dem. Rep.      Saudi Arabia 
Congo, Rep.      Syrian Arab Republic 
Eritrea        Tunisia 
Ethiopia        United Arab Emirates 
Gambia, The         
Ghana         
Guinea-Bissau         
Kenya           
Lesotho           
Malawi            
Mali           
Mauritania         
Mauritius           
Mozambique         
Namibia           
Niger           
Nigeria           
Rwanda           
Senegal           
South Africa         
Sudan           
Tanzania            
Togo           
Zambia           
Zimbabwe           
  